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Abstract 
In February and March 2018 the 3rd Plenum of the 19th CPC Congress and the 
ﬁrst meeting of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) were held. During 
these meetings, important and far-reaching structural reforms were adopted, 
including constitutional amendments, restructurings of the government and 
the relationship between Party and state. Structural reforms are common at the 
outset of a new ﬁve-year NPC term, and it is important to understand these 
reforms as part of an ongoing process. The recent reforms, however, were re-
markable in the way they rearranged Party–state relations and bolstered not 
only the Party but, importantly, Xi Jinping's authority as core leader. This article 
provides a detailed overview of the major changes in constitution, government 
structure (ministries and state departments), personnel and Party authority.
Keywords:  Communist Party of China, Chinese National People's Congress, institu-
tional reform, personnel changes
Introduction
Four months after the Communist Party of China (CPC) held its 19th 
Party Congress, the National People's Congress (NPC) convened its 
annual session. The meeting, which ran from 5 to 20 March 2018, dis-
cussed several important issues such as premier Li Keqiang's govern-
ment report, constitutional amendments, leadership reshufﬂes and 
institutional reform.
This article provides an overview of the major decisions and initia-
tives taken at the NPC meeting. First the main content of the government 
work report will be presented. The second part of the article focuses on 
the leadership reshufﬂe that took place at the meeting. The third part 
discusses the constitutional amendments that were passed, including the 
decision to abolish the term limits for the presidency. The fourth part 
addresses the newest round of institutional reform, which will affect 20 
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ministries, being the most ambitious restructuring of the central govern-
ment structure since Zhu Rongji's reforms in 1998. We will also discuss 
the strengthening of CPC authority overall, including supervision of 
discipline and corruption.
Government Work Report 
A major task of the NPC session was to hear and approve the govern-
ment work report presented by prime minister Li Keqiang (Li 2018a). 
The report summarized the economic achievements and problems of 
the past ﬁve years and outlined the goals and policies for 2018. The 
prime minister mentioned that China's gross domestic product (GDP) 
had risen from 54 trillion to 82.7 trillion RMB, registering average an-
nual growth of 7.1 per cent. The Chinese economy's share of the global 
economy had grown since 2013 from 11.4 per cent to 15 per cent. China's 
contribution to global growth had exceeded 30 per cent. Li underlined 
that the contribution of consumption to growth had increased from 
54.9 to 58.8 per cent over the same period and the share of the service 
sector in the economy had risen to more than 51 per cent, indicating a 
new more balanced growth path. 
As a result of continued economic growth, personal income had 
increased by 7.4 per cent, outpacing economic growth and creating the 
world's largest middle-income group. Moreover 68 million people had 
been lifted out of poverty, bringing the poverty headcount ratio down 
from 10.2 per cent to 3.1 per cent. Social pension schemes had expanded 
to cover 900 million people and basic health insurance plans covered 
1.35 billion people.
The prime minister also mentioned that China's investment in research 
and development had grown rapidly and now only ranked second in 
the world in terms of scale. He listed manned spaceﬂight, deep-water 
exploration, quantum communications and large aircraft development 
as major outcomes of innovation. He added that in e-commerce, mobile 
payments, the sharing economy and high-speed rail China is now lead-
ing the world. Since 2013 China's high-speed railway track expanded 
from 9,000 to 25,000 kilometers and China now accounts for two-thirds 
of the world's high-speed railways. 
In the work report, Li Keqiang admitted that there were still major 
problems related to pollution, although the number of days with heavy 
pollution in major cities had fallen by 50 per cent. There were also still 
problems of overcapacity, although China had cut steel production 
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capacity by more than 170 million metric tons and coal production 
capacity by 800 million tons.
The work report also outlined the projected targets for economic 
growth in 2018. The growth rate and inﬂation rate were set at 6.5 per cent 
and 3 per cent respectively, the same targets as in 2017. The projected 
growth rate would create 11 million new jobs and keep the registered 
urban unemployment rate within 4.5 per cent. A steady rise in import 
and export volumes were expected, along with a basic equilibrium in 
the balance of payments. Even though the growth rate still would be 
signiﬁcant, the plan was to reduce energy consumption by 3 per cent 
per unit of GDP. 
On poverty alleviation and social welfare, in addition to the 86 
million people lifted out of poverty in the past ﬁve years, the report 
stressed that the government would seek to lift another 10 million over 
the poverty line in 2018. The government would also increase general 
transfer payment to local governments by more than 10 per cent in or-
der to strengthen local ﬁnances, especially in the western and central 
regions. 
Poverty alleviation was mentioned alongside pollution and risk as one 
of the 'three critical battles' that the government would continue to be 
engaged in. The battle against risk involved more coordinated control 
over the ﬁnancial sector. Therefore the merger of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBCR) and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) came as no surprise. The newly formed entity will 
report directly to the State Council, while the function of making laws 
and regulations related to the work of CBRC and CIRC will be handed 
over to the People's Bank. The much-debated supply-side structural 
reform also aims to prevent any systemic ﬁnancial risk in addition to 
eliminating excessive overcapacity.
The work report and the discussion at the NPC indicate that China has 
overcome a minor economic slowdown and is not about to experience an 
economic hard landing. The increase from a growth rate of 6.7 per cent 
in 2016 to a growth rate of 6.9% in 2017 shows that the Chinese economy 
is again on an upward turn. Another positive development is that eco-
nomic growth appears to have become more balanced. The excessive high 
investment following the global ﬁnancial crisis has slowed down by 3 
percentage points, causing consumption's share of GDP to rise. In sum, 
we are seeing early signs of the necessary change in the structure of the 
Chinese economy towards one that is less unbalanced and more reliant 
on the consumer demands of the Chinese population (Wolf 2018).
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Personnel Changes
As expected, the NPC meeting resulted in a major leadership reshufﬂe at 
the state level (see Table 1). Also as expected, Xi Jinping was reelected as 
president and Li Keqiang as premier. In a surprising move Wang Qishan 
was elected vice president even though he is no longer a member of the 
central committee of the CPC. Even more surprising was the decision to 
remove the two-term limits for president and vice president. This clears 
the way for Xi to stay in power indeﬁnitely. Chinese sources claim that 
this was not the main objective of the constitutional amendment passed 
on 11 March. Rather, the objective is to bring the Chinese presidency's 
institutional mechanics in line with the ofﬁce of the general secretary 
and the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, where no 
term limits apply (Li 2018b).
Leading up to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, there was 
much speculation about the future political role of Wang Qishan. 
Many observers of Chinese politics posited that he might continue 
on the Politburo Standing Committee. However, as Wang Qishan had 
turned 69 in July 2017, this would violate the unwritten rule of '68 
down, 67 up' (Brødsgaard and Christensen 2017). In the end this rule 
was upheld and Wang Qishan was retired from all his Party positions 
and was not reelected to the Central Committee. But Wang Qishan's 
appointment as vice president gives him a new and important political 
role. Given his extensive experience and close relationship to Xi, it is 
unlikely that his vice presidency is a ceremonial role like that of most 
of his predecessors. Although his portfolio in the Politburo Standing 
Committee was to direct the anti-corruption campaign, he has an ex-
tensive background in economics and diplomacy and has previously 
been in charge of the strategic dialogue between the USA and China. 
He will be an important asset for Xi in handling the difﬁcult relation-
ship with the USA.
At the NPC meeting Li Zhanshu took over Zhang Dejiang's role as 
NPC Chairman. This was expected as the number three in the Party 
hierarchy, except in the case of Li Peng, normally functions as head of 
the NPC. Similarly, Wang Yang, in his capacity as number four in the 
Party hierarchy, succeeded Yu Zhengsheng as Chairman of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). In the case of Wang 
Yang this may seem like a waste of talent as he is regarded as an efﬁcient 
economic administrator and might be of more use as vice premier in 
charge of economic work.
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TABLE 1. The Chinese government (March 2018)
Ministry Minister
Foreign Affairs Wang Yi 王毅
National Defence Wei Fenghe 魏凤和*
National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC)
He Lifeng 何立峰
Education Chen Baosheng 陈宝生
Science and Technology (R) Wang Zhigang 王志刚*
Industry and Information Technology Miao Wei 苗圩
State Ethnic Affairs Commission Bater 巴特尔
Public Security Zhao Kezhi 赵克志
State Security Chen Wenqing 陈文清
Civil Affairs Huang Shuxian 黄树贤
Justice (R) Fu Zhenghua 傅政华*
Finance Liu Kun 刘昆)*
Human Resources and Social Security Zhang Jinan 张纪南*
Natural Resources** Lu Hao 陆昊*
Ecological Environment** Li Ganjie 李干杰
Housing and Urban-Rural Develop-
ment
Wang Menghui 王蒙徽
Transport Li Xiaopeng 李小鹏
Water Resources E Jingping 鄂竟平*
Agriculture and Rural Affairs** Han Changfu 韩长赋
Commerce Zhong Shan 钟山
Culture and Tourism** Luo Shugang 雒树刚
National Health Commission** Ma Xiaowei 马晓伟*
Veterans Affairs** Sun Shaocheng 孙绍骋*
Emergency Management** Wang Yupu 王玉普*
People's Bank of China Yi Gang 易纲*
National Audit Ofﬁce Hu Zejun 胡泽君
* New ministers 
** New ministries established 
Leading up to the NPC there was widespread speculation and discus-
sion concerning the anticipated formation of a new 'super' anti-graft 
agency in the form of a National Supervision Commission (NSC). As 
expected, the NSC was introduced as a new type of state organ in the 
amended constitution. The new commission was formed from the 
merger of the Ministry of Supervision and National Bureau of Corrup-
tion under the State Council, and the Ofﬁce Against Dereliction of Duty 
and Anti-Corruption Department of the Procuratorate. It was ranked 
above the Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate, but below the 
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central government. Yang Xiaodu, Politburo member and deputy head 
of the Party's Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC), 
was appointed head of the NSC. The new commission was formed 
to consolidate all activities of anti-graft institutions and to legitimate 
extralegal investigations of public ofﬁcials under the name of 'rule of 
law'. This includes managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), hos-
pitals, educational and cultural educations, sports organizations and 
even village governments and research institutes. Top leadership felt a 
need to establish the new agency due to the fact that, in principle, the 
CDIC can only investigate corruption and graft among Party members 
and not all public ofﬁcials are members of the CPC. However, with the 
appointment of Yang Xiaodu, who as deputy is ranked lower than the 
head of the CDIC, Politburo Standing Committee member Zhao Leji, 
it is clear that the activities of the new commission will be coordinated 
and overseen by the Party.
Han Zheng, Sun Chunlan, Hu Chunhua and Liu He were all endorsed 
by the NPC as vice premiers. Given the fact that Han Zheng is the low-
est ranking of the seven Standing Committee members it was expected 
he would take over Zhang Gaoli's portfolio. Sun Chunlan had a long 
career as Party secretary in Fujian and Tianjin before she became head of 
the United Front Department in 2014. She is the only women at the top 
level of government and in fact also the only woman in the Politburo. 
Hu Chunhua has extensive provincial experiences as Party secretary in 
Chongqing and Guangdong and has also served as ﬁrst secretary of the 
Youth League. He has long been rumored as one of the top candidates 
to succeed Xi, if he steps down in 2022. In Xi's eyes Hu is handicapped 
by his close association with the Youth League and his reformist tenden-
cies. However, as one of the four vice premiers he still has a chance to 
advance to the Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress. Liu He 
is Xi Jinping's right-hand man in economic affairs and he runs the ofﬁce 
of the important economic and ﬁnance leading small group. Among the 
vice premiers he is likely to outshine Han Zheng.
State Councillors were also almost completely replaced, except 
for Wang Yong. The new State Councillors are Wei Fenghe, member 
of Central Military Commission and minister of National Defence, 
Xiao Jie, secretary-general of the State Council and former minister 
of Finance, Zhao Kezhi, minister of Public Security and former Party 
secretary of Hebei, and, ﬁnally, foreign minister Wang Yi. He replaces 
former foreign minister Yang Jiechi, who has been promoted to the 
Politburo.
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Among the 27 ministers there were 11 new faces. These include Yi 
Gang, who replaces Zhou Xaochuan as Governor of the People's Bank 
of China. Yi Gang has been deputy governor of the bank since 2008, 
so his appointment is not expected to bring any major change to Zhou 
Xiaochuan's monetary policies in attempting to leverage the massive 
debt and manage ﬁnancial risks. Among the new ministers, there are 
also two former business executives from the oil and gas sector: Minister 
of Science and Technology, Wang Zhigang, who is former senior vice 
president of Sinopec, and Minister of Emergency Management, Wang 
Yupu, who is former general manager of Petro China. Three other 
members, who have a background in the SOE sector, include Minister 
of Transportation, Li Xiaoping, who has served as chairman of Huaneng 
Power Corporation, and the Minister of Information Technology, Miao 
Wei, who is former general manager of Dongfeng Auto Corporation. The 
ﬁfth minister, with a business background, is the Minister of Commerce, 
Zhong Shan, who was general manager of Zhejiang Zhongda Group 
Limited before shifting to government work. These examples show the 
close relationship between big business and government/Party in China. 
This is also the case at the provincial level where one-ﬁfth of all China's 
governors and vice governors have a background in business.
At 65, Wang Yi and Zhao Kezhi are the two oldest members of the 
State Council; at 50, Lu Hao is the youngest. Lu Hao was appointed ﬁrst 
secretary of the Youth League in 2008 and thus already gained ministe-
rial rank at the age of 40. In 2013 he was moved to Heilongjiang to be-
come governor. His relatively young age combined with both provincial 
and central leadership experiences will provide a good background for 
moving further up the Party hierarchy. However, his afﬁliation with 
the Youth League and Li Keqiang may not be an advantage in the eyes 
of Xi Jinping.
Constitutional Amendments
One of the decisions of the NPC that has received most attention, and 
criticism, is the range of amendments to the state constitution.1 It was 
decided to scrap term limits for the President that were added to the 
constitution in 1982, and which so far had been limited to two terms of 
ﬁve years. But this was only one of 21 amendments made, all of which 
were proposed at a CPC Central Committee meeting in February (Xin-
hua 2018), and overall these amendments reﬂect the general trend of a 
stronger Party around Xi Jinping as core leader. Important amendments 
_______________________________________________________________________ 113
___________________________________________ Structural Reforms and CPC Power
were made in the preamble of the constitution, which is where China's 
development is historicized and the CPC's reading of its role as ruling 
Party is outlined. The preamble now includes a reference to Hu Jintao's 
theoretic-ideological contribution, the 'Scientiﬁc Outlook on Develop-
ment', but, more importantly, it also contains Xi Jinping's contribution. 
This is unusual, as both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were only 'consti-
tutionalized' only after they had stepped down. Undoubtedly, this both 
shows and is proof of Xi Jinping's authority as leader and his resolve to 
push his vision for China's development. 
With the addition of ''Xi Jinping thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a new era'', Xi has not only been elevated to the stand-
ing of former Party leaders, but in fact has also been set apart from his 
predecessors. Using the term 'thought' (sixiang) for his theoretical-ideo-
logical programme, places him on a level with Mao Zedong's thought, 
and thus gives his ideas more weight than even Deng Xiaoping's 'theory' 
(lilun). Moreover, the term 'for a new era' points at a break from Deng-
ist times and a shift towards a more assertive (at least more proactive) 
international proﬁle, which legitimizes Xi's turn towards a much more 
authoritative, Party-centered governance of China domestically. This 
was already hinted at in earlier speeches by Xi, where he talked about 
China's 'three thirty years periods', meaning the periods under Mao, 
Deng and now himself. Concepts introduced under Deng such as 'sepa-
ration of Party and government' are, in other words, out of fashion, and 
the 'new era' is marked, in Wang Qishan's words, by a 'division of labour' 
between Party and state, with the Party clearly in charge. 
While Xi Jinping has been cemented as the core leader, the Party's 
status as the supreme leading institution has more generally been un-
derscored by the amendments. Article 1 was changed from 'The social-
ist system is the basic system of the People's Republic of China' to 'The 
deﬁning feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leader-
ship of the Communist Party of China'. This puts the CPC into the main 
body of the constitution, whereas previously it was only mentioned 
in the preamble. Article 24 was changed to include the 'core socialist 
values' as primary objectives of the state, another concept favoured by 
Xi Jinping, and now constitutionalized. Government ofﬁcials now are 
required to take an oath to the constitution (article 27), a practice that 
was until then common only in the Party, where new members take an 
oath to the Party constitution. 
Two further amendments worth noting are related to the new State 
Supervision Commission (SSC), which is now mentioned several times, 
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and its position as primary supervision body (albeit under the Party's 
watchdog, the CCDI). The amended Constitution also speciﬁes details 
of the new body, among others granting authority to elect the chair-
person of the SSC to the NPC. At the same time, the changes also strip 
away supervision authorities from the State Council, as they now lie 
within the SSC.
Finally, another important policy area pushed by Xi Jinping has found 
its way into the constitution, with the addition of the 'State Council func-
tion and power to (…) the building of an ecological civilization'. This 
means that environmental affairs now are a responsibility of the State 
Council, underscoring the importance the Xi administration attaches to 
climate change and pollution issues (see also below).
Ambitious Institutional Reform
The NPC meeting decided on an ambitious institutional reform (jigou 
gaige) affecting over 20 ministries and commissions in the State Council. 
While restructuring during NPC congresses are common, this round 
turned out to be quite a substantial reshufﬂe of authorities, consolida-
tion of new, powerful organs, and a strong trend to closely integrate 
and realign the state apparatus under CPC authority (Xinhua 2018). It 
is important to note that the meetings of the NPC were preceded by a 
Party meeting (the 3rd Plenum of the 19th CPC Congress), announcing 
changes to the organizational structure of the central state and Party 
only days before the NPC meeting (CPC 2018). Seen from a broader 
perspective, this newest round of institutional reforms is clearly meant 
to bolster CPC authority over and within the state apparatus 
With interim periods of about ﬁve years – that is, in 1982, 1988, 1993, 
1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 – the Chinese leadership has implemented 
such reform in an attempt to streamline and downsize the bureaucracy 
in order to make it more efﬁcient. The last restructuring of a similar large 
scale took place in 1998 when Zhu Rongji merged or closed 15 ministries 
and commissions under the State Council. This time the reshufﬂe also 
aims to consolidate Party leadership over the state apparatus.
The 1998 administrative reform reduced the number of ministe-
rial-level working departments of the State Council from 41 to 29 and 
downsized central-level staff of the State Council from 32,000 to 16,000 
(Brødsgaard 2002). A number of the old branch ministries in the machin-
ery and heavy-industrial sector, which had existed since the Soviet-style 
planning system was introduced in the early 1950s, were organized into 
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bureaus, thereby losing their ministerial-level status. Other ministries 
were merged such as the Ministry of Electrical Industry, the Ministry of 
Post and Communications and the Ministry of Radio, Film and Televi-
sion. Their functions and personnel were transferred to a new Ministry 
of Information Industry. 
In 2003 a new, but less dramatic, reform of the administrative reform 
was carried out. This involved the establishment of a new State-Owned 
Asset Supervisory and Administration Commission in order to have 
a ministerial-level agency that could supervise and manage the large 
SOEs. Moreover, the State Development Planning Commission was 
restructured into a new body, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and a Ministry of Commerce was re-established. 
Finally, existing ﬁnancial regulatory bodies were reorganized into the 
People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission and 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission. As a result, there were 28 
ministries and commissions under the State Council (Liu 2008).
However, the Chinese government continued to be concerned 
about the administrative structure at the central level. There were 
voices arguing for further streamlining of administrative organs 
as well as personnel. In 2008 a new plan for institutional reform of 
the state administrative apparatus was adopted under the headline 
of 'a system of larger ministries' (da bumen tizhi) within areas of 
priority. The goal was to create a number of strong ministries that 
would bring together related functional areas. Subsequently five 
new superministries were established. They were the Ministry of 
Industry and Information, the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Construction, and the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection. However, the powerful Ministry of Railway managed 
to keep its independent status in light of 'the consideration of the 
special needs' in managing the railways. 
The 2008 reorganization affected 15 government organs and reduced 
the number of ministries and commissions from 28 to 27 – three of 
these were commissions (Renmin ribao 2008). This was a less substantial 
downsizing and reorganization than originally anticipated. It had, for 
example, not been possible to merge the Ministry of Railway with the 
new Ministry of Transportation. Powerful interests were against the 
merger since it would downgrade the importance of the railways in 
China's transportation system. In a similar way, entrenched interests 
were able to block the idea of creating a Ministry of Energy.
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In 2013, it ﬁnally became possible to abolish the Ministry of Railway 
and merge its administrative functions with the Ministry of Transpor-
tation and transfer its commercial activities to a new SOE. The 2013 
reshufﬂe also involved several mergers such as a merger of the Ministry 
of Health and the Family Planning Commission, a merger of the State 
Food and Drug Administration and the State Commission on Food 
Safety, a merger of the Administration of Press and Publication and 
the State Administration of News, Broadcasting, Film and Television 
(Brødsgaard and Grünberg 2013). It was also decided to create a more 
comprehensive administration of maritime issues. However, it was still 
not possible to establish a new Ministry of Energy.
All these restructurings and reshufﬂes involved intense turf wars 
between the various ministries and agencies. Essentially it is a question 
of positions and budget as speciﬁed in the bianzhi system (Brødsgaard 
2002). Every institutional reform is based on san ding. This concept has 
three dimensions. The ﬁrst is to determine the functions needed in a 
given government organ (ding zhineng). The second dimension of the 
concept is to ﬁx the number of administrative organs (ding jiguan) on the 
basis of the deﬁned core functions. The third aspect is about determining 
the number of personnel (ding renyuan). This is done on the basis of the 
functions and administrative organs that have been deemed necessary 
to uphold. Administrative organs will be allocated personnel according 
to the functions and tasks they are supposed to take care of. 
The current revamping of the central government structure is based 
on the san ding exercise, which involves tough inter-bureaucratic bar-
gaining. However, this time the reform is different: it's not only about 
creating a leaner and more efﬁcient government system, it is also about 
strengthening the Party's control over the government. In this sense, it is 
yet another example of the current leadership's intention to no longer to 
follow Deng Xiaoping's policy of separating Party and government.
Overall, the NPC reduced the number of ministry-level organizations 
by eight, and the State Council now includes 26 ministries, seven of them 
newly established from reassigned authorities (see Table 2). 
2018 Revamping of Central Government
An important part of the 2018 restructuring is the consolidation and 
strengthening of ministries and departments in charge of environmental 
and natural resource management issues. This was to be expected, as 
environmental protection and green development have been priorities 
_______________________________________________________________________ 117
___________________________________________ Structural Reforms and CPC Power
TABLE 2. State Leaders in China (March 2018)
President Xi Jinping 习近平
Vicepresident Wang Qishan 王岐山
NPC chairman Li Zhanshu 栗战书
CPPCC chairman Wang Yang 汪洋
















Head of National Supervisory Commission Yang Xiaodu 杨晓渡
under Xi Jinping for some time. As early as December 2016, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Law was promulgated, with tougher regulation 
and harsher penalties for transgressions, and more authority vested in 
local environmental protection bureaucracy, which came into effect on 
1 January 2018. A 'war against pollution' declared in 2014 is beginning 
to show effects, for example with less air pollution in Beijing,2 and ever 
since the programmatic 'ecological civilization' was written into top-level 
policy at the third Plenum of the 18th CPC Congress in November 2013, 
environment and resource conservation policy have been underscored 
as important areas for leaders, also at local levels (State Council 2014: 
56). Responsibility for coordinating ecological civilization related poli-
cies had in 2013 been assigned to the powerful Leading Small Group 
for Comprehensively Deepening Reform's sub-group for economic 
development and ecological civilization, headed by Liu He, a sign that, 
at least at a conceptual level, growth and environment were now seen 
as connected areas. Furthermore, the current ﬁve-year plan (2016–2020) 
boasts a relatively large section on 'ecosystems and environment', and 
this overall trend towards a greener and 'beautiful China' has now been 
underpinned by structural reforms in the central administration.
A new Ministry of Ecological Environment has absorbed several func-
tions and organizations, among others the former Ministry of Environ-
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mental Protection, the climate change and carbon reduction authorities 
of the NDRC (including the Leading Small Groups for climate change 
and emission reduction work), and pollution controlling functions of, 
among others, the Ministries of Agriculture, Water Resources, and Land 
and Resources. The new Ministry of Natural Resources has taken over 
the responsibilities of a number of organizations, chieﬂy the Ministry of 
Land and Resources (abolished), NDRC planning authorities, the State 
Oceanic Administration (abolished), the Ministry of Water Resources, 
and others. This new ministry has a more consolidated mandate to 
administrate and plan natural resources including land, and by gath-
ering these responsibilities in one organization, solves fragmentation 
issues that had hampered policy implementation across jurisdictions. 
Lastly, a newly established Ministry of Emergency Management has 
taken over a number of responsibilities and is charged with reacting to 
and preventing environmental (as well as social) disasters and crises, 
such as drought, wildﬁre prevention and ﬂoods, all functions formerly 
embedded in separate ministries and administrations. 
These changes clearly make sense from a perspective of consolidating 
authorities over resource, land and environmental protection policy re-
spectively in one organization. Management of water and land resources, 
for example, was previously hampered by the fact that jurisdictional 
boundaries made coordinated policy difﬁcult. The new Ministry of Eco-
logical Environment is a clear indicator that the Xi administration aims 
to live up to the promises of a greener and cleaner China, and has now 
given formal, administrative authority to the stricter laws and standards 
set over the last ﬁve years of the Xi administration.
Other changes that deserve mentioning are that the Ministry of Ag-
riculture has expanded its portfolio and has had its name changed to 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. A new Ministry of Veteran 
Affairs has been created, which takes over functions from the Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security, the NDRC and even from the 
Central Military Commission. The new Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
is based on a merger of the former Ministry of Culture and the National 
Tourism Bureau.
The newly created National Health Commission, which to a large de-
gree is identical with the abolished National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, will target the issue of population ageing and stimulate the 
development of age-old industries and services. It is expected that by 
2030 a quarter of China's population will be 60 years old and older. 
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Regulating Finance 
Since 2009, the fallout from the stimulus packages launched in reaction 
to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008/09 has begun to show, in form of non-per-
forming loans, overcapacity and unsustainable government spending, 
especially at local levels and in the state-owned sector. Furthermore, 
ﬁnancial services and capital investment by both public and private 
actors have grown rapidly, and Chinese ﬁnancial services are increas-
ingly pushing for new markets, both domestic and international. These 
developments and a number of shortcomings in the regulatory structure 
have now led to efforts strengthening the regulation and leadership of 
banking and ﬁnance. 
Structurally, the NPC decided to merge the China Banking Regulatory 
and the Insurance Regulatory Commissions into the new China Bank-
ing and Insurance Regulatory Commission. Moreover, 'upgrading' the 
Leading Small Group for Finance and Economy (LSGFE) to commission 
gives the Party stronger macro control over ﬁnancial policy. 
China's central bank, the People's Bank of China, now is under a strong 
double leadership team. Yi Gang replaced Zhou Xiaochuan as governor 
of the bank, while Guo Shuqing serves as the bank's Party secretary. 
Both are highly capable and experienced ofﬁcials, with prior positions 
in ﬁnancial institutions. Yi Gang holds an American PhD degree, and 
has published numerous academic articles and books on economics. 
There has been speculation about the exact division of labour between 
the two leaders, and Chinese ofﬁcial media have reported that Guo, as 
Party secretary, will be overseeing the bank's most important and stra-
tegic decisions, while Yi Gang will be in charge of its daily operations. 
Moreover, Guo also serves as Party secretary of the aforementioned 
Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. Liu Shiyu has taken 
over leadership of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and 
together with Guo and Yi, Chinese media have dubbed this new team 
the 'new three-horse chariot' leading China's ﬁnancial regulatory regime. 
After a number of cases of ﬁnancial instability, debt issues in the state-
owned sector, and excessive investment in both state-owned as well as 
private companies (some recent high-proﬁle cases are Anbang and HNA 
Group), it became clear that the Xi administration would consolidate 
ﬁnancial watchdogs and banking. 
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The Party Widens its Mandate
Overall, it has become manifest that Xi Jinping has been pushing the 
strengthening and broadening of the CPC's leadership mandate over 
China in ways that have surprised most, if not all China watchers, and 
even many people in China. Party leadership and its superiority vis-
à-vis the state is nothing new in itself, but it is being formalized and 
institutionalized at a pace and scale unseen after 1978. The new, con-
solidated Party is not merely 'leading China', as deﬁned in both state 
and Party constitutions, but its rule is underscored by the restructuring 
plan adopted at the 3rd Plenum (CPC 2018). The plan points out that: 
'Party, government, military, the people, and education, the East, the 
West, the South, the North, and the Center, the Party is the leader of 
everything'.3 
A signiﬁcant indication of the broadening of Party authority is the 
reorganization of the State Administration for Public Service under the 
Party's Central Organization Department (COD). This is the bureau in 
charge of the civil servants, which used to be part of the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security. The bianzhi administration, the 
ofﬁce in charge of planning and allocating personnel and organizational 
resources, was also put under the COD. This means that the Party is now 
effectively in charge of all human resource allocations, including for non-
Party organizations and public servants who are not Party members.
The media has always been under supervision in China, but the 
CPC's control has been tightened in this round of restructuring. The 
State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television 
was disbanded and its function divided into three organizations. One 
of these, the new State Administration of Radio and Television, remains 
under the State Council, but the two other new administrations, one 
for Film, and one for Press and Publication, are now under the CPC 
Publicity Department (Propaganda Department). Moreover, the China 
Publishing Group, a state-owned publishing house until now under 
the State Council, will also fall under the supervision of the Publicity 
Department. This means that media content will increasingly be directly 
controlled by the CPC and the Party's narrative will become even more 
dominant in all media. Indeed, in ofﬁcial documents the media sector 
is referred to as the 'ideological sector', implying the functionality the 
CPC sees in media and its use for political means.
The Party's control over strategic policymaking and coordination 
has been enhanced and formalized by the upgrading of four important 
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Leading Small Groups (LSGs) into Commissions. These LSGs are the 
LSG for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, Finance and Economy, 
Foreign Affairs, and the LSG for Cybersecurity and Informatization. 
This change of status from LSG represents a formalization of central 
institutions in the Party-state and signals a consolidation of their formal 
authority in coordinating these important policy areas. 
Conclusion
Overall, the 3rd Party Plenum of February and the 1st Session of the 
13th NPC in March have been remarkable in several ways. As we have 
outlined above, Xi Jinping has not only consolidated himself as the 
core leader, but he has been able to include his agenda into the state 
constitution. Moreover, under Xi the Party has been strengthened quite 
remarkably, and even taken steps back from the (feeble) separation of 
state and Party organizations undertaken under Deng Xiaoping. The 
CPC under Xi Jinping has in in every aspect widened its mandate and 
its grasp over the state apparatus, its personnel and society at large. At 
the same time, supervision and anti-corruption efforts are institutional-
ized and formalized, and Xi's programme for a clean and loyal Party, 
including harsh methods to ensure loyalty and punish transgressions, 
has been made a central element of the Party-state. An ambitious insti-
tutional reform of ministries and bureaus under the State Council has 
been introduced, affecting more than 20 ministries and commissions. 
Regulation of economy and ﬁnance has been consolidated and green 
development underscored as a key priority. Initiating and overseeing 
these developments is a powerful state and Party leader who has suc-
ceeded in abolishing term limits for leadership position and having his 
name written into both the Party and the state constitution. 
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NOTES




3  Original text: 党政军民学，东西南北中，党是领导一切的.
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TABLE 3. China's Government (March 2018)
New Ministries
New    Functions taken over from
Ministry of Ecological 
Environment
Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(replaced)
National Development and Reform  
Commission (NDRC) (climate change)
Ministry of Land and Resources  
(water pollution)
Ministry of Agriculture (pollution)
State Oceanic Administration  
(Ocean pollution)
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs
Ministry of Agriculture (replaced)
Ministry of Culture  
and Tourism
Merger of the Ministry of Culture and 
National Tourism Bureau
Ministry of Veterans 
Affairs
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Hu-
man Resources and Social Security, and 
the Central Military Commission
Ministry of Natural  
Resources
Ministry of Land and Resources  
(replaced)
State Oceanic Administration
 National Surveying and Mapping Bureau
National Health  
Commission
National Health and Family Planning 
Commission (replaced)
The medical and health-care reform  
leading small group under the State 
Council (dissolved)
Ministry of Emergency 
Management
National Safety Production Supervision 
Management Bureau (replaced).
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Ministry of Environmental Protection
Ministry of Land and Resources
Ministry of Supervision
National Health and Family Planning Commission
New Ministries
Ministry of Natural Resources
Ministry of Ecological Environment
Ministry of Culture and Tourism
National Health Commission
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
Ministry of Veterans Affairs
Ministry of Emergency Management
Retained ministries
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of National Defense
National Development and Reform Commission
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Science and Technology
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
State Ethnic Affairs Commission
Ministry of Public Security
Ministry of State Security
Ministry of Civil Affairs
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Water Resources
Ministry of Commerce
People's Bank of China
National Audit Ofﬁce
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Changes to Administrations under the State Council
Abolished Administrations
China Food and Drug Administration
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection,  
and Quarantine 
National Bureau of Corruption Prevention
National Tourism Administration
State Administration for Industry and Commerce
State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television
State Administration of Work Safety
State Forestry Administration
Legislative Affairs Ofﬁce of the State Council
China Banking Regulatory Commission
China Insurance Regulatory Commission
National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation
State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs




State Forestry and Grassland Administration/National Park  
Administration
State Grain and Reserves Administration
State Immigration Administration
State Administration of Radio and Television
State International Development Cooperation Agency
State Medical Insurance Administration
State Market Regulatory Administration
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
Source: NPC Observer (2018).
